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Abstractus: 
This inquiry seeks to establish the importance of the critiques leveled by Thorstein Veblen 
and Tony Lawson against the orthodox economics.  In order to advance this point this 
inquiry advances the notion that Neoclassical school and its sub school known as marginal 
utility theory are constructed upon shaky philosophical and methodological foundations 
that include the hedonistic conception of man, Benthamite Utilitarianism, static equilibria, 
and the use of the mathematical deductivist method far beyond its scope of effectiveness.  
Writing in two different time periods, Veblen and Lawson comment upon the same 
essential methodological maladies and then advance alternative methodologies and 
ontologies aimed at reorienting a classical physics based economics towards a social-
biological future. 
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Selected Critiques of the Philosophical Underpinnings of the Neoclassical School 
 
This inquiry seeks to establish that both Thorstein Veblen and Tony Lawson offer 
penetrating critiques of Neoclassical Theory.  For a little more than a century the discipline 
of economics has been dominated by a school of thought that can loosely be dubbed as the 
Neoclassical School.  With this inquiry the development of the Neoclassical school will be 
traced by employing a critical exposition of the work of several key figures who in various 
ways contributed seminal ideas to what would ultimately become the core of today’s 
orthodoxy.  These figures are Jeremy Bentham, who developed utilitarianism and the 
felicific calculus; William Stanley Jevons, who mathematized Bentham’s ideas of utility by 
merging them to logic and calculus; and Alfred Marshall, who incorporated those previous 
ideas into a sophisticated system of economic thought that, despite his notion that a 
biologically based economics was the Mecca of all economists, borrowed heavily from 
Newtonian physics for his models and equations.  During that last century, the discipline of 
economics and its various prescriptions for action have gone on to hold considerable 
influence in everything from the formation of government policy to the level of the 
decisions of the private consumer of Starbucks Coffee.  The importance placed upon this 
body of theories and equations is immense, and yet relatively little ink has been devoted to 
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a rigorous questioning of the foundations upon which the whole edifice is constructed.1  
One of the most prolific critics of orthodox economics was Thorstein Veblen, who, in a 
series of articles and books not only challenged the philosophical underpinning of 
economics, but suggested that economics be loosed from the shackles of Newtonian physics 
and be recast in the mold of a Darwinian evolutionary science.  Furthermore, Veblen’s 
philosophically based critique of marginal utility theory and the Neoclassical school as a 
whole, is still incredibly salient and has been joined by modern criticisms from the likes of 
Professor Tony Lawson.   The common threads that bind together the critiques of Veblen 
and Lawson is their shared insistence that the economic laws postulated by the likes of 
Smith, Jevons, and Marshall, and the mathematical deductive method that derives and 
employs the laws are tautological in nature and make for exceedingly unstable foundations 
upon which to build the discipline of economics.  The ultimate end of this work is to 
demonstrate the importance and relevance of the contributions of Thorstein Veblen and 
Tony Lawson as they offer penetrating critiques of Neoclassical Theory. 
 
Jeremy Bentham and Utilitarianism 
It is certainly no great secret that the notion of Homo Economicus finds its roots in the 
principle of utility advanced by Jeremy Bentham.  The following exposition of Bentham’s 
ideas, as found in his Theories and Morals of Legislation [1789] (1967), serves the purpose 
of laying out in as clear a way as possible the simple system of Bentham and the effects his 
system of thinking would ultimately have for the methodology of Neoclassical Economics.  
                                                          
1
 This may in fact be due three factors: the effectiveness of the critiques, the ease with which the Emperor is 
disrobed, and the recalcitrance and intransigence of the established orthodoxy. 
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The investigation into Bentham also is the first point in this investigation of the 
development of the Neoclassical thought and its underlying philosophical commitments as 
it continues through Jevons, the rather staunch Benthamite; and all the way to Alfred 
Marshall, a thinker of a far more nuanced and complex nature.    
 
Felicific Calculus and Its Methodological Implications 
Bentham’s (1967, 125) inquiry into the human condition and his subsequent placement of 
utility as the central motivating force of human life began with the following famous 
excerpt: 
“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and 
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what 
we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of 
causes and effects are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in 
all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to 
demonstrate and confirm it.” 
 Bentham (1967, 126) states that utility is the property to produce benefit 
that lies “within the object”.  Bentham does not posit, nor is there any indication 
elsewhere that he means otherwise, that the happiness itself lies within the subject.  
That distinction becomes unimportant as what is most important is the nature of the 
calculator and not the exact relationship between the calculator and the calculated.  
Bentham (1967, 126) states that there is in fact no such thing as a “community” 
either in the sense that a community can have needs nor in the more central sense 
that there is some sort of emergent causal agent referred to as a community.  Any 
such conception of community is referred to by Bentham as a “fictitious body”.  The 
only suitable conception of community is simply as the sum of the individual parts, 
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for according to Bentham (1967, 127), whatever mechanism within the human 
psyche that is supposed to calculate pain and pleasure is wholly free from the 
complications brought on by exterior social structures.  This notion of vacuum 
dwelling human beings would indeed become a foundational point of neoclassical 
economics. 
 However, Bentham (1967, 132) fails to  actually state that pain and pleasure 
calculation is the only means available for human beings, nor does he state that it is 
the only one in use.  His work is in fact a prescriptive treatise on why pain and 
pleasure calculation ought to be wholly adopted as the formal means by which we 
derive opinions.  Bentham (1967, 128) does argue that many people who claim to be 
making decisions from something other than a pain/pleasure matrix are mistaken, 
and are in fact actually engaging in a felicific calculus, but there are notable 
examples of people who he finds to be genuinely (and in his view mistakenly) living 
life without invoking a felicific calculus.   
The two most pronounced alternative categories are asceticism and the dual 
matrix of sympathy/antipathy.  Bentham (1967, 132) rails against asceticism, 
claiming that the aim of the practice is at complete odds with the felicific calculus 
and he does so without qualifying that those who practice asceticism may in fact be 
doing so as part of a quest for happiness (some are, some are not).  When speaking 
of the principle of sympathy and antipathy, Bentham (1967, 138-139) defines it as 
“that principle which approves or disapproves of certain actions, not on account of 
their tending to augment the happiness . . .” Bentham (1967, 139) goes on to state 
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that it is not in fact a principle, but a behavior based upon the negation of all 
principle.   
What importance might this discussion have?  The potential importance here 
is the presence of further evidence that Bentham was not claiming that human 
beings are perfect and consistent calculators of utility.  This, of course, does not 
mean that humans aren’t capable of being such calculators.  Bentham might have 
been wrong in his allowance for other factors in human decision making processes.   
The important thing to note here is that Bentham is making normative statements 
as opposed to descriptive statements.  What does seem to be a solid inference from 
this apparently heterogeneous description of human motivation from none other 
than Jeremy Bentham, is that the foundations of homo-economicus as a being of 
perfect utility calculating abilities seem shaky even at their supposed point of 
genesis. 
 There is furthermore nothing that would indicate that the foundations for 
Homo Economicus seemed any more certain in 1871, when Jevons made that 
conceptualization a central pillar of his theory, than there was in 1789.  This would 
indicate that the choice for such a conception may have come more from the fact 
that such a simplified conception of individual human beings, and the society which 
they comprise, lends itself more easily to incorporation in mathematical models, 
than other more multifarious conceptions of human beings. 
When looking at the history of economic thought from the standpoint of 
methodology, points of great importance are the theoretical entities chosen, why they are 
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chosen, and how they determine, and are determined by, the greater theoretical system in 
which they are placed.  The adoption of Utilitarianism as a foundational methodological 
framework was a great hinge on which subsequent economics turned. 
 
Differences with John Stuart Mill 
Some of the theoretical importance of Bentham’s brand of utilitarianism can be seen by 
comparing it to the Utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill, which is primarily elucidated within 
Mill’s Utilitarianism [1861].  The important difference between the two systems is Mill’s 
(2002, 247-249) assertion that not all happiness is of the same qualitative stature.  There 
are higher pleasures and lower pleasures, and the difference between the various pleasures 
is great enough that Mill finds that it would be far more preferable to be a miserable 
Socrates than if one were to be a happy idiot.  This distinction in happiness levels to a 
certain extent pulls the rug out from underneath hedonistic man, in that the notion of 
utility becomes itself subject to change in any given individual over a given span of time 
and in the aggregate of individuals.   
 In the following section I will attempt to further demonstrate that Bentham’s brand 
of hedonistic Utilitarianism, as opposed to Mill’s more qualified brand, was essential in 
order to make Jevons’ system work. 
 
 
Jevons’ Selection of Bentham’s Utilitarianism over Mill’s Utilitarianism 
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In the article “John Stuart Mill’s Philosophy Tested, IV, Utilitarianism” [1879] found within 
a posthumously published anthology of his work entitled Pure Logic and Other Minor Works 
[1890], Jevons goes to great lengths to  differentiate the Utilitarianism of Mill from the 
Utilitarianism of Bentham, whose brand of Utilitarianism was at that point eclipsed by 
Mill’s version.  Jevons (1890, 262) broadly characterizes Mill’s treatment of Utilitarianism 
as illogical and overly sentimental, confusing sense with sentiment.  By “removing the 
obstacles . . . he removed its landmarks too, and confused everything.”  The first point at 
which Jevons criticizes Mill is in his doctrine of separating pleasures and pains into higher 
and lower categories.  Jevons (1890, 277) does so by noting that Bentham did not make 
such a move, and that the “pure pleasure” of Bentham was simply a pleasure that was 
unlikely to be followed by an attendant pain; the example provided being Opium smoking.  
Finally, because Bentham did not create classes of intrinsically different or superior 
pleasures, the counting of pleasures and pains could be carried out in the simple manner of 
balance sheet.   
Jevons (1890, 279) continues, reiterating that although there can be conceived two 
different kinds of Hedonism, Egoistic and Universal Hedonism, that Universal Hedonism 
should not be thought of as anything other than the whole collection of individuals acting 
under the auspices of the Egoistic variety.  Among the many criticisms that Jevons levies 
against John Stuart Mill is that Mill is affected by a certain over sentimentality which has 
the tendency of making his reasoning imprecise.  Conversely, Jevons places great emphasis 
on those parts of Bentham and Sidgwick which denote a certain mathematical rigor.    
Ultimately, the importance of demonstrating Jevons’ distaste of Mill’s Utilitarianism is to 
demonstrate that Bentham’s account may have been chosen in part because the feelings of 
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Bentham’s human beings are far easier to calculate than the feelings of human beings 
under Mill’s account.  The deeper question here,  
 
Jevons 
This paper’s exploration of Jevons’ work takes place primarily within the confines of his  
Theory of Political Economy [1871] (1888).  The philosophical spine of the book is made 
explicit by Jevons (1888, 2-3) rather early in the work with the assertion that utility, and 
not labor, is the sole creator of value.  For Jevons, labor will only appear to have an effect on 
the creation of value by way of increasing or lessening the supply of a quantity.  In short, 
Jevons argument of this point centers on the simple notion that much work could be put 
into the creation of an object, but if the object was undesirable, then the value would be 
significantly diminished.  In stark contrast to Veblen’s later scientific preference, it was 
Jevons’s (1888, 2-3) belief that all good sciences were by nature fully expressed through 
mathematics and a large degree of his mission in publishing his treatise was to bring such 
concepts as wealth, utility, value, demand, supply, capital, interest, and labor into a fully 
mathematized language.  The underlying, though perhaps circular, reasoning for the shift 
towards mathematical models is best expressed in Jevons’ (1888, 3) own words, “. . . our 
science must be mathematical, simply because it deals with quantities.”  In answer to the 
criticism that mathematics ought not to be brought in to economics because the numbers 
so imprecisely fit the data, Jevons argues that that has been the case throughout the history 
of even the hardest sciences.  Citing examples in support of this claim, he puts forward the 
work of Galileo, the initial theory of the tides, various theories of dynamics, and the 
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hypothesis that the Earth was essentially a large spheroid.  In short, Jevons recognizes the 
prime aspect of science to be the use of mathematics as opposed to some form of predictive 
ability.  For Jevons, the math is always ahead of the science, which may belie the kind of 
Platonist leanings so common among a great many mathematicians.   
Jevons (1888, 8) further claims that there are two types of sciences, those that are 
purely logical and those that are both logical and mathematical.  Those sciences that make 
predictions that involve there being less or more of a phenomena belong to the group that 
involve the mathematical.  Therefore, any field of human study that involves such 
statements, sooner or later, must be expressed in mathematical terms.  This notion holds 
true as long as social and biological entities could be considered as behaving in ways not at 
all dissimilar to the ways in which planets, atoms, and electrons behave. 
In addition, Jevons (1888, 9) states that if we express something in terms of a 
magnitude, in terms of greater or lesser, then ultimately that thing is akin to other things 
such as weight or temperature and accordingly is a type of thing that ought to be expressed 
mathematically. 
Jevons admits that the ability to measure the feelings of the human heart in 
quantitative terms is lacking.  Jevons (1888, 11) then advances that we measure the 
feelings at the base of utility theory, by measuring “the quantitative effects of the feelings.”  
Jevons uses the analogy of measuring gravity (something intangible) through the motions 
of the pendulum, to measuring human feelings/will through the oscillations of the “price 
lists of markets”.  This statement makes sense if and only if the hedonistic account of 
human beings is an accurate account.  This is necessarily so because any account 
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possessing of more complexity would make an accurate calculation of quantity as it 
concerns feelings exceedingly difficult.    Ultimately, it seems  a poor analogy due to the fact 
that gravity is a simple hypothetical type that successfully explains many different 
phenomena, whereas human feelings were then and still are known to be constantly 
affected by a large heterogeneous category acting non-uniformly on what isn’t truly a 
“logical simple” (the price lists of the market). 
 This work by Jevons is a key in understanding the entire neoclassical/marginal 
utility school that followed.  Jevons attempted to turn human feelings into discreet, 
measurable units fit to be placed within deductivist mathematical models.  In later years 
this utilitarian calculus would ultimately be supplanted by a far easier to swallow theory of 
preferences, but if one views the employment of a mathematical deductivist method as one 
of the primary hallmarks and hard cores of Neoclassical Economics, then one clearly finds 
in Jevons’ work the founding assumptions.  
 
Marshall 
The work of Alfred Marshall is an inexhaustible font of scholarly fascination.  He was equal 
parts philosopher, mathematician, and economist.  His life and work bridge together the 
intellectual currents of the 19th and 20th centuries.   His most complete and famous work, 
The Principles of Economics [1890] served to crystallize and systematize all the work that 
had been previously undertaken during the marginalist revolution: the graphic 
representation of the supply and demand curves, marginal utility fully merged with the 
language of classical physics.  All the while, Marshall (1920, xiv) worked to maintain the 
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connection of economics to the cradle of Moral Philosophy in which it was originally 
birthed, and looking to the future of the discipline, was planning to bring economics closer 
to the biological sciences, stating in the Preface to the Principles that “the Mecca of 
Economists lay in Biology.”  In that most of his models and analogies were grounded in 
Newtonian physics, we may label Marshall an arch Neoclassicist.  However, the scope of his 
work and the range of his sentiments are so broad, that it is almost a disservice to place 
him in any tight taxonomy.  Thus, for the purposes of this paper, our inquiry will adhere to 
the philosophical and methodological aspects of Marshall’s economics.  Among those 
aspects, the most important points of investigation center upon Marshall’s understanding 
and interpretations of science, utilitarianism, and evolutionary theory. 
Marshall’s (1920, xiv) understanding of the philosophical grounding of the scientific 
method is a fairly sound and mainly uncontroversial understanding:  scientists make 
observations, collect facts, and infer provisional laws.  The word provisional here is 
important for he indeed recognizes the risk of formulating laws, and in his own words 
understands that “since we must form to ourselves some notions of the tendencies of 
human action, our choice is between forming those notions carelessly and forming them 
carefully.”  The qualification that his understanding is “mainly” provisional also has some 
bearing upon the current conversation as one of the many important points advanced in 
Thomas Kuhn’s (and by many other philosophers of science) seminal work Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions [1962] was the idea that many, if not all, of the theory neutral 
observations that underpin science are in fact “theory laden”: all of the events that we view 
are done so through gross or subtle theoretical lenses.   This idea of theory-laden 
observation will later be shown to be implicit in both Veblen’s and Lawson’s critiques of 
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the mathematical deductive method.  As a whole, on the basis of methodology, Marshall’s 
argument is perhaps more sound than that of Jevons as Marshall takes more care on 
deciding what can be measured and by what means within the discipline of economics.  
Marshall compares economic laws not to the law of gravitation as did Jevons, but to the 
laws of the tides.  The difference here is significant as (at least according to the ideas of 
gravity before Einstein) the study of tides takes into account a greater abundance of 
elements than did the study of gravity.   
Indeed, Marshall (1898, 42-43) states explicitly that life sciences are qualitatively 
different than the physical sciences when he wrote, “all sciences of life are akin to each other, 
and are unlike physical sciences.  And therefore in the latter stages of economics, when we are 
approaching nearly to the conditions of life, biological analogies are to be preferred to the 
mechanical, other things being equal.”  Furthermore, Marshall (1920, 1-3) states in the first few 
pages that the character of human beings is very much formed by the work that they perform, 
that poverty very often leads to degradation and that human beings are driven not solely by 
economic motives, but by religious and artistic influences as well. 
Any conversation on the extent to which evolutionary thinking is integrated into 
economic methodology it is necessary to indentify the specific interpretation of evolution 
in play.  In “The Mecca of Alfred Marshall” [1993] Geoffrey Hodgson lays out the extent to 
which Alfred Marshall’s system of economics was unable to incorporate biological 
analogies.  Much of the conversation centers on the marked influence of Herbert Spencer 
upon Marshall’s thought.  This Spencerian methodological influence has significant 
ramifications for the types of theoretical entities that would go on to populate Marshall’s 
system. 
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The matter here is a matter of ontology.  Specifically, creating a biologically based 
economics would require the development of a biologically based ontology as opposed to an 
atomistic, mechanically based ontology.  In an atomically oriented ontology one conceptualizes 
and reifies an “average person” and from that starting point treats large groups of people as if 
they would behave as an aggregate of that average person.  A biologically derived ontology 
treats the economic sphere as something akin to an ecosystem and pays attention to many of the 
same elements that caught Veblen’s eye: namely institutions.  Instead of rationality underwriting 
economic processes, the influence of habits and instincts (another prominent Darwinian element) 
take on a prominent role. 
 
Marshall and Bentham 
To what degree Marshall could be considered a Benthamite?  If Marshall could be 
considered to part ways with Bentham significantly, could there be later inconsistencies at the 
level of his methodology?  In the article “Jevons, Marshall, and the Utilitarian Tradition” [1990] 
R. D. Collison Black (1990, 8-10) advances the view that Marshall was in no way a 
thoroughgoing Utilitarian, but nonetheless did not ever fully remove Utilitarian presuppositions 
from his system.  The resulting perception is that at times he seems a Benthamite Utilitarian and 
at other times he puts forward views completely anathema to the Benthamite tradition.  Black 
(1990, 10) states that the primary difference between Jevons and Marshall lies in Marshall’s 
unwillingness to base economics in anything so crude as an unrefined hedonism.  Marshall 
retained the notion of utility maximization, but took into account historical and evolutionary 
trends.  Ultimately, Marshall’s ideal conception of economics would have involved economics 
being tied to the ultimate aims of life, not simply to superficial and intermediary aims. 
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Veblen 
Thorstein Veblen’s critique of Neoclassical economics and the economics of the Marginal 
Utility theorists are examined within this work through several of his most important 
journal articles: “Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?” [1898], “The 
Preconceptions of Economic Science II” [1899], and “The Limitations of Marginal Utility” 
[1909].  The main themes of Veblen’s critique are the unfortunate presence of tautologies 
within economics, the abundance of “supernatural” a priori statements, and the fallacy of 
the hedonistic conception of man, which itself is an amalgamation of the former two 
informal fallacies. 
This first of these articles is essentially the founding text of the Evolutionary-
Institutional school and this paper opens with the bold statement that all sciences that are 
truly modern are constructed along evolutionary lines.  The article is a serious of critiques 
of various thinkers and schools of thought.  Marshall is given credit for approaching the 
notion of an evolutionary science, but is “overly modest” and deferential to the old guard 
19th century classical economists.  Veblen (1898, 375) recognizes that the German 
Historical school collected a great deal of data, but fell short of being a science as the 
dialogue was limited to a kind of historical narrative account of industrial processes.  Mill 
dealt with certain processes with skill, but his economics ought not to be construed as 
evolutionary.  The problem with economics is not that it fails to address facts, because 
there are plenty of facts utilized in economics.  The problem with economics is that the 
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theory that underlies and often permeates the facts is itself filled with metaphysical 
presuppositions not based in reality. 
 Veblen (1898, 378-381) continues along this line by pointing out the various ways 
in which economists have constructed their theories utilizing not fact based cumulative 
causation, but metaphysical entities.  Among these entities are ‘natural laws’, natural rights, 
natural inclinations, and various orders of nature.  These natural law based systems have 
the tendency of interpreting new information under the conceptual aegis of the natural law.  
These purported natural laws are also tied by Veblen to the common sense opinions of the 
time.  The ends that the laws are leading to are the products of the “current common sense 
ideas of what should come to pass”.  Thus the systems set up ultimately serve as devices for 
validating the opinions of the inventors. 
Within modern sciences, facts are known in terms of causal sequences.  Sciences, 
including economics, which treat of the “normal” course of things are in need of renovation. 
In other words sciences that too overzealously classify phenomena into the rubric of a 
system of natural law are of a mere taxonomic nature.  The difference between 
evolutionary and pre-evolutionary science is not a quantitative difference, but a qualitative 
difference: a difference in interpretation. 
The positive solution Veblen offers for the renovation of economics is a biologically 
inspired system of cumulative causation.  In this system, man is not viewed as a “lightning 
calculator of pleasures and pains”, but is more akin to a “coherent structure of propensities 
and habits which seeks realization and expression in an unfolding activity”.  Desire here 
arises from temperament, which itself is a product of habits and instincts.  The 
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environment and the individual could be said to both be emergent properties that affect 
and are effected by one and another.  The basic level at which this research is undertaken is 
in humanity’s interaction with the physical means of existence. 
 
Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics 
What are the mechanisms of this Evolutionary Economics?  Veblen’s (1898, 415) 
explanation of evolutionary economics begins with the notion that the economic life history 
of individuals is a cumulative process in which individuals are constantly engaged in the 
dynamic activity of adapting means to ends within the medium of an ever changing 
environment.  In this process, both the individual and their environment are constantly 
affected by the cumulative processes of the past.  This is also the case with the community 
as “the economic life history of any community is its life history in so far as it is shaped by 
men’s interest in the material means of life”.  Veblen (1898, 405) states that evolutionary 
economics must be a theory of how economic interests shape cultural growth, and a theory 
of how economic institutions are cumulatively changed through this process. 
 The paradigmatic metaphor for the difference between evolutionary sciences and 
physico-taxonomic sciences is the comparison of the studying of a reef to the studying of 
the polyps that give life to the reef.  Veblen (1898, 409) puts forward the notion that we 
must find in economics terms analogous to cytoplasm, centrosome, and the karyokinetic 
process to become free from the metaphysics of normalcy.  Taxonomic systems, in many 
ways more useful than conceptions of natural laws, are limited in the same way.  
Taxonomic systems are incapable of giving insight into the changes that dynamic systems 
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undergo.  Veblen’s emphasis that economics should be akin to the study of the polyp is 
important in several ways.  For one, it seems to emphasize agency in Veblen’s evolutionary 
process.   In some forms of evolutionary thought, taxonomic schemes are given great 
emphasis in the sense that they seem to map out an orderly and somewhat determined 
trajectory of evolution. 
 The analogous objects of study to found the basis of a more biological economics 
would be the very ways in which human agents make changes to their environment 
through force of body and force of knowledge.  These life processes can be neatly placed 
under the aegis of cumulative causation.  For Veblen (1898, 410), the changes that take 
place in mechanical contrivances are best understood by paying heed to the changing 
knowledge of the human beings that cause the change.  To think of capital goods, simply as 
a stock of inert tools, ready to be utilized by humans is for Veblen sufficient as a base for a 
taxonomic understanding, but not for a truly dynamic understanding.  The whole world 
around is both influences our habit of thoughts and is directly shaped by our habits of 
thought.  The factories, roads, cups, and airplanes of this world are concretized habits of 
human thought.  We, as human beings, are both subjects and objects inhabiting a world that 
is many ways also both a subject and an object. 
 
Shortcomings of the Neoclassical School 
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Veblen’s paper begins by stating that all of the most important sciences of his day were in 
fact economic sciences.2  According to Veblen (1898, 411), the shortcomings of the 
Neoclassical system are several.  The first point of criticism is reliance upon “natural laws” 
as devices for explanation.  For instance, Veblen (1898, 407) represents Adam Smith’s 
notion of an invisible hand as a kind of “coercive surveillance” that provides a “spiritual 
stability” to the whole economic process.  Indeed, all such a priori elements, when 
compared to an evolutionary conception, are rather satirically seen to be of a 
fundamentally different “spiritual” nature.  In Veblen’s view, these conceptions of natural 
law are seen to be no better than the metaphysical conceptions of the medieval church.  In 
short, reliance upon natural laws as means of explanation is detrimental to economics 
because it has the effect of limiting the lens through which economic activity is viewed.  
Since the premises that support those natural laws are built upon the prejudices of the 
time, the conclusions are liable to be somewhat tautological in nature.  This reminds one of 
the famous story in which Karl Popper questioned Alfred Adler on how Adler concluded a 
certain diagnosis.  Adler replied he knew his diagnosis to be the case because he had seen it 
“one thousand times before”, to which Popper replied “and now you have seen it for the 
thousand and first time.”  In both cases, danger is that a confirmation bias has led to a 
conclusion.  Veblen (1898, 405) contrasts the current evolutionary scientists of his day 
with the earlier scientists and posits that while the current scientists restrict themselves to 
                                                          
2
 This is a somewhat problematic notion simply due to the fact that science is far from homogeneous and also for 
the fact it could be said that the dominance of a certain kind of physics has only really been challenged in the last 
century by relativity theory, quantum theory, and recent advances in biology. 
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questions of cause and effect, the scientists of time’s past were overly fond of notions of 
natural law.3  If economics is to be a proper science, tautologies must be cast aside.  
What is this equilibrium to which all things are supposedly going?  What are the 
bases for which we believe in this equilibrium?  Veblen (1898, 409) responds that the idea 
of a normal point of equilibrium to which all things tend was not any more rational than the 
teleological ideas of Aristotle and the later Christian Church fathers.  He proceeds further 
by stating that the rather arbitrary assumption of a point of equilibrium is tantamount to 
simply accepting all of the commonplace notions of progress of a given era and deciding 
from them the point to which all things travel.  Economics becomes a “working out” from 
the notions of the time towards whatever ultimate ends seem the ultimate goals of human 
activity.  
 If the notion of equilibrium is a wholly arbitrary construction, then the 
ramifications for the discipline of economics are simply extraordinary.  As an arbitrary 
conception, loaded with the biases of the time, the equilibrium would at best be able to 
represent a frozen picture of an economy.  It could only be part of a set of tools that can 
offer a description, but couldn’t take part in offering any prescriptions.  This is so, because 
such a frozen conception has within it no understanding of the dynamic forces constantly 
working through the actors and institutions playing parts in the grand economic 
choreography.   In the end, what is interesting here is the obvious: the mainstream of 
                                                          
3
 This is also a somewhat problematic premise as the thrust of the sciences of his time and of our time very much 
remains the search for ever simpler explanations to ever more broad fields of phenomena, noted instances being 
Maxwell’s unification of electricity and magnetism, Feynman’s unification of quantam mechanics with Maxwell’s 
laws, and the current efforts to link quantum mechanics and relativity theory.  Conceptions of natural laws are, 
such as gravity (initially considered a weird spooky theory) have proven to be exceedingly accurate predictors of 
phenomena. 
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economic thinking has changed very little in the past century.  The equilibrium is enshrined 
in so many textbooks, institutions, and minds. 
 For Veblen (1898, 413), the hedonistic conception of man proves narrow, 
unrealistic, and misleading.  Hedonistic man is a passive subject, moved to and fro by the 
vagaries and vicissitudes of the world.  He is “isolated”, “self poised”, and in this isolation is 
somehow still a “lightning calculator of “pleasures and pains”.   This is misleading because 
in so many ways “no man is an island”.  All economic actors, all human beings have a 
history that shapes them, have needs that change and evolve, and go on to develop new and 
different methods of modifying the means with which to pursue those ends.  Can an 
economy populated by perfectly rational actors ever really change and evolve?  Veblen 
(1898, 389-90), in characterizing rational economic man as a “definitive human datum”, 
“self poised in elemental space”, and ultimately “following the line of the resultant” clearly 
is arguing that pleasure seeking robots could not account for the type of change and 
diversity witnessed in the human drama.  Through a hedonistic view, the economic interest 
of the actors cannot be understood in terms of change and activity.   
According to Veblen (1898, 411), the new anthropological research of his day 
reinforced the notion that humans characteristically do things from their own volition.  
Human beings are “coherent structures” of propensities and habits.  These propensities 
and habits have a gravity of their own to such an extent that to exclude them from the study 
of economic life would create a limited picture.  The question of course is, what ultimately 
fuels those propensities and habits?  What galvanizes them into motion?  The notion that 
the search for happiness is the energizing agent does not seem to be thrown out of court.  
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However, even if some sort of felicific calculus is present, Veblen’s critique holds a great 
deal of water.  Veblen (1898, 411) argues that the activities of the past clearly have an 
effect on both the present objective circumstances and the new state of an individual’s 
habits and propensities.  In any given moment, the variables from the previous moment 
have given rise to a highly modified, if not entirely different set of propensities. 
If this is even partially so (and it seems very much to be so), then what constitutes 
happiness for a human being is open to change and will vary incredibly across a population.  
It follows that models of equilibrium, represented through supply and demand curves, 
could at the very best be thought of as representations of averages of what goods human 
beings will demand at what price.  How does one generate a picture of a representative 
human or a representative firm?  Indeed, on Veblen’s model there is so much capacity for 
change that even a fairly accurate graphical representation could not be relied upon as an 
accurate predictor for subsequent time periods.  It is at this point that economics is truly 
freed from teleological tendencies. 
 
Veblen’s Interpretation of Evolution 
Veblen’s interpretation of evolution is not explicitly stated, but a reading of the text seems 
to reveal the presence of ideas similar to Spencer, Darwin, and Lamarck.  The mechanism of 
evolution in Lamark’s system is a great deal more deterministic and orderly than the 
chance and accident driven system of Darwin.  When Veblen (1898, 404-405) uses such 
phrases as “orderly unfolding”, “orderly unfolding development of fact”, and “dispassionate 
cumulative causation” one is lead to think that the evolution of an economy may in fact be 
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deterministically grounded either in some unchanging atomic constituents or else that 
there are hidden in the background of Veblen’s thought “laws of process” that give order to 
a potentially messy process of evolution.   If the latter were the case, then Veblen would be 
playing the same a priori natural law tune that he so harshly criticized Smith for playing.  If 
the former is true, it would seem to erode human agency in adapting means to ends.  If it 
doesn’t undermine human agency, it may change what conception we have of human 
agency.  It is not wholly clear to me if Veblen is some kind of biological/materialist 
reductionist or whether he has even fully committed to some such metaphysical position.  
If he has, it would be an important point from which to understand the degree to which his 
tacit ideological commitments help to govern the workings of his evolution.  Said another 
way, there seems to be a difference in human beings learning and adapting because they 
are so programmed, and learning and adapting as an extension of being a free agent.  In any 
event the presence of a law or laws of process does not seem to be the case either, as 
Veblen places a good deal of importance on human agency as a central and necessary 
component of an evolutionary economics. 
 On the importance of human agency, there are a great many textual reasons to 
believe that a less deterministic agency is important for Veblen’s notion of evolution.  On 
Veblen’s account (1898, 404-405) the physical properties are to be viewed as the constants 
and the human element, in working with these substances, is given the primacy of the 
study.  In all areas of human endeavor, it is the human knowledge that is most dynamic part 
of the process of change. 
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Veblen on Marginal Utility 
Veblen’s critique of the school of marginal utility is found in full form in his article “The 
Limitations of Marginal Utility” [1909].  This article is in essence a continuation of Veblen’s 
earlier Preconceptions of Economic Science and as such is aimed at deconstructing the same foil 
of taxonomy.  In this case, the target of Veblen’s darts is none other than John Bates Clark, his 
old teacher at Carleton.  For Veblen (1909, 620), marginal utility theory is only a theory of 
valuation and in that vein is only capable of rising to the level of a “wholly statical” taxonomic 
system, despite the claims of Clark that marginal utility theory is a dynamical theory.  Veblen 
(1909, 622-623) states that the hedonistic view is incapable of dealing effectively with the 
phenomena of growth.  Veblen (1909, 622) points out that the difference between the 19th 
century classical economists and the economists of the marginal utility school rest primarily in 
the fact that the marginal utility school adheres more strongly to the notion of hedonistic man 
and are more consistent in the practical limitations imposed by this.  In both schools human 
beings are exceptionally rational and clear headed and preternaturally “farsighted in appreciation 
of future sensuous gains and losses.”  To this, Veblen (1909, 623-624) takes up a couple pages to 
say something very simple: human beings do not seemed to be armed with the requisite 
foresight, clear-headedness, or even the rational machinery to make the theory of marginal utility 
work.  In addition to this criticism Veblen asserts that the hedonistic conception is unable to truly 
account for human interaction.  The ideas of marginal theory are cast as part of the institution of 
business culture that was present at the time of the writing; elements that if questioned would call 
into question the validity of the whole institution. 
The study of economics ought to be a genetic inquiry into the human scheme of life, the 
subject being human relations with the material world.  Material civilization is a scheme of 
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institutions, themselves emergent phenomena sprouting from the accumulation of habits as 
culture is seen by Veblen as a “cumulative sequence of habituation”.  In such a scheme, each 
new change creates a different system that affects the entirety of the system in just the same way 
that dropping a pebble into a pond will have effects that spread across the entire system.  
Marginal utility theory comes up short because the individual cannot be treated as separated from 
the influence of the institutions that constantly bear down upon him/her. 
When institutions are taken into account by the marginal utility theorists they are taken as 
given elements; the noted example being the ownership of property, which is viewed as an 
immutable right and something always to be desired.  In closing, Veblen outlines the degree to 
which ownership and all of the attached pecuniary considerations give rise to a multitude of 
habits responsible for forming society.  Veblen (1909, 630-632) goes on to state that marginal 
utility economics has the tendency of ignoring or recasting the institutional elements of business 
into a hedonistic language, which has the effect of obscuring and removing the very elements he 
found fit to study.  The value of this paper comes from the addition of his theory of institutions to 
his critique of the taxonomic underpinnings of so-called neoclassical economics. 
 
 
Peirce, Veblen, and Habits 
Useful to the conversation on Veblen’s thought and methodology as well as a conversation 
on trends in 19th century science and philosophy is a necessarily brief consideration of the 
work of Charles Sanders Peirce.  Central to the times in which Peirce was thinking and 
writing was the working out of the implications of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory.  
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As has already been seen, a great deal depends on the degree to which a thinker attempted 
to apply evolutionary theory to their economic scheme and upon which particular 
interpretation they were drawing.   
An element that ties many of Peirce’s interests together is the notion of continuity 
called synechism and that there are certain processes that can only be properly studied as 
continuities.  Peirce’s (1950, 354) own definition of synechism is “that tendency of 
philosophical thought which insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance in 
philosophy, and, in particular, upon the necessity of hypotheses involving true continuity.”  
What Peirce was ultimately trying to do was create sufficient grounds for the reality of 
causal relationships.  How can objects really work upon each other with such space in 
between them?  “How can one mind work upon another mind?”  While both Kant and Hume 
would teach us that we are ultimately not able to give anything more than a provisional or 
inferential reality to causal relationships, Peirce (1950, 356) puts forward that our 
problems stem from the tendency to view objects as discreet entities that are able to 
separated one from the other.  Peirce solves this problem by putting forward the view that 
in reality there are no discreet things that give rise to boundaries or gaps.  This thinking is 
analogous to the main notion found in The Origin of Species [1859] as, previous to Darwin 
(and still in many circles), species were viewed to be the possessors of unchanging 
essences; a notion more commonly known as the immutability hypothesis. It could be said 
that in Darwinism the species bleed into one another over the long vastness of time.  The 
ontology of the word “species” is then not a discreet entity, but is rather an emergent 
formulation.  Peirce’s project was challenging due to the fact that the very structure of our 
grammar and language (subject-verbing-object) lends itself to the reification of the subjects 
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and the objects in their representation as nouns.  This interpretation of Peirce’s work is 
bolstered when Peirce (1950, 356) states that “where there is continuity, the exact 
ascertainment of real quantities is too obviously impossible.  That said, it must be stated 
that the philosophy of language, at least in this regard, was not a major part of Peirce’s 
research program. 
 For Peirce (1950, 356), uncertainty was an extremely important principle, and 
comes about for Peirce, as once the objects are given strictly provisional status, then 
everything by necessity is in fact uncertain.  Along with uncertainty there comes a noted 
lack of teleology.  Peirce rejects Spencer’s notion that “from the disorganized comes the 
organized” on various grounds, most important among them the fact that any teleology is 
implicitly dependent upon some permanent structure on which to hang its ontological hat. 
This previous point of departure with Spencer is in fact one of the main themes 
underlying the discussions in this paper for this is a point at which Spencer departs from 
Darwin, for Darwin’s evolution was driven by chance, while Spencer began to see more 
than just chance behind “evolutionary laws” and gave a different meaning of “survival of 
the fittest” than Darwin’s intended meaning for the term (a term not used by Darwin until 
1866).  If there are no longer any discreet objects per se then the concept of “cause and 
effect” takes on a very different form of meaning and requires a type of thinking that is very 
different and seemingly counterintuitive.  Just as habit is an important term in Veblen’s 
system so it was important in the system of Peirce and his fellow pragmatists.  Unlike 
“natural laws”, habits are fungible and open to modification.  Habits can both affect and be 
effected.  In thinking about the term from a linguistic point of view, a habit is a rather verb-
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like noun: it is a term for an open ended dynamical process.  The world is a habit that is 
filled with habits that act upon one another to form other habits!  What dynamism!  When 
one thinks of an institution as a habit or a series of habits, then the fluid nature of 
evolutionary institutional economics comes alive.  It is in all of these lights that the work of 
Peirce is so important for studying Veblen, because it explains the philosophical workings 
of Veblen’s evolutionary economics from an angle that perhaps Veblen doesn’t make fully 
explicit. 
As in any science, the outcomes of research are greatly dependent upon the level of 
reality that is being studied and theories will differ based upon the taxonomic arrangement 
that is enforced upon the things of this world.   
For Veblen (1898, 411) the hedonistic conception of man is not suitable as a basis 
for the study of human economic life, as the hedonistic man is “not the seat of a process of 
living”.  In Veblen’s (1898, 411) view man is not a “lightning calculator of pleasures and 
pains”, but is more akin to a “coherent structure of propensities and habits which seeks 
realization and expression in an unfolding activity”.  Desire here arises from temperament, which 
itself is a product of habits and instincts.  The environment and the individual could be said to 
both be emergent properties that affect and are effected by one and another.   
 What exactly does Veblen (1898, 411) mean when he states that “the activity is itself the 
substantial fact of the process . . .?”  In a kind of Kantian-meets-late-19th century anthropological 
vein, Veblen (1898, 412-413) seems to stress that human beings arrive in this world with a 
variety of innate habits and tendencies that express themselves in a wide spectrum of foci: 
economic, sexual, humanitarian, etc.  While we are certainly motivated by the poles of pain and 
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pleasure, they are by no means our exclusive masters, and even if they were our exclusive 
masters, the complexity of channels through which they would play out would render the system 
unintelligible in strict binary terms. 
 It was previously mentioned that habits could be considered the mediums through which 
causation is transmitted.  If that is the case, then the conception of habits would be a pillar of 
Veblen’s edifice.  To make this statement more clear and three dimensional one first considers 
one of the prime targets of Veblen’s (1898, 406-407) barbs: notions of natural law such as Adam 
Smith’s conception of an invisible hand.  Veblen is clearly wary of such purely inferred 
principles, and it must be noted that science is full of such inferred principles (gravity, electric 
fields), all of them theoretically provisional, many of them treated as sacred cows.  However, 
sound scientific methodology prohibits one from using underdetermined theoretical entities in 
the role of an a priori theoretical element.  If Veblen wishes to do away with these sorts of 
entities (and it is not precisely clear that is what he means) then they would require a new sort of 
principle to take their place.  Habits are uniquely suited to serve that function owing to the fact 
that habits are able to work within a system in two directions, i.e. individual habits work to shape 
institutions and institutions in turn partially determine the habits taken on by individuals. 
 
Lawson 
In his article “What is this School Called Neoclassical Economics?” [2013] Tony Lawson 
investigates the philosophical foundations of modern economics and comes to conclusions 
very similar to those of Thorstein Veblen.  Through a close scrutiny of why neoclassical 
economics is referred to as neoclassical economics, Lawson (2013, 947-954) unearths the 
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foundational assumptions of economic methodology.  In Economics and Reality [1997], 
Lawson critiques both poles of marginal utility theory, while in the later article he focuses 
primarily upon the marginal half of the combination.   According to Lawson (2013, 950), 
modern economic thought seems to no longer even adhere to the highly questionable “holy 
trinity” of rationality, selfishness, and equilibrium  In fact, economic methodology has 
moved almost wholly into being naught but an outgrowth of mathematical deductivism, 
featuring “laws” and equations almost wholly removed from the organizing assumptions of 
Jevons and Marshall.  The term neoclassical is perhaps used to move the discussion from 
the real problems of the discipline.  For Lawson (2013, 973), the real problem of the 
discipline is now the almost complete reliance on mathematical deductivist methodology.   
The problem with the over use of mathematical modeling is that mathematical models are 
useful in very few actual situations.   
There is thus a problem of social or methodological ontology which has much to do 
with the presuppositions of mathematical regularity.  Modern economics is carried out 
within a “closed system” in which all that occurs can be neatly explained by the rules that 
are already in place and governing the system.   
Social reality, however, possesses an emergent quality in which the individuals 
inhabiting the system are affected by the greater system and cannot be said to behave in 
the way a purely atomistic system would behave.  Social reality is better said to work 
according to a system of cumulative causation.  This social reality consists of emergent 
phenomena, constituting highly internally related causal processes.  Much of the bulk of 
this article is devoted to a solid and detailed explanation of several of Veblen’s articles, 
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most notable being The Preconceptions of Economic Science.  Lawson goes on to clarify that 
Veblen’s term neoclassical is really referring to any school that carries with it certain 
metaphysical preconceptions that ultimately underwrite all subsequent theory.  Some 
schools are biased by a tendency towards teleology (Smith, Bentham) while others seem 
somewhat more free of teleology (Mill), and some, such as Marshall see the merits of an 
evolutionary theoretical perspective, yet still adhere to tautology creating entities such as 
equilibria.  The common thread among all of these thinkers is that they engage in what 
Veblen calls taxonomic systems.  Even Keynes (the elder) and Marshall are unable to 
escape from the taxonomic core of their work.  Indeed, Lawson reminds us that Marshall 
had stated his intention to rewrite the Principles along biological lines as opposed to the 
classical physics line of the original.  Neoclassicals also include those who have some 
recognition that the social world runs on causal-processual lines yet continue to heavily 
utilize mathematical models, often where they are little effective.   
 A fascinating point can be found in Lawson’s (2013, 973-974) account of how 
changes in mathematics in the early decades of the 20th century led to the almost full 
mathematization of this discipline.  In short, before the 20th century, mathematical research 
was more tethered to how well mathematical theories fit to the realities of the world.  The 
discipline of mathematics was far more practically oriented.  In the mid-19th century a 
small movement grew that was intensely interested in problems of infinity, continuity, and 
infinitesimals.4  For the most part this movement operated at the margins of the profession.  
With the early 20th century advent of relativistic physics and quantum theory, the type of 
mathematics that was once pushed to the margins came to the fore.  The ramifications of 
                                                          
4
 Jevons and Peirce both prominent members of this group. 
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this change were that mathematicians were encouraged to deal in much more esoteric 
formulations, with a notion that one didn’t need problems in order to come up with 
solutions.  Once untethered from real world problems, mathematics took a progressively 
Platonic term by reifying a progressively greater amount of purely mathematical entities.  
This great proliferation of mathematical entities led to the mathematization of economics 
and other disciplines which then led to a resulting mixture of clarity and obfuscation within 
the various disciplines subjected to the treatment. 
 Lawson (2013, 979) classifies modern economists as basically falling into three 
groups.  The first group of economists are essentially practitioners of a taxonomic science 
and utilize mathematical deductivism, as expressed through mathematical models, as their 
methodology. The second group of economists is filled with those economists who fully 
understand that the social world is a causal-processual world.  These economists work to 
create methodologies that address this social ontology.  The third group of economists has 
some understanding of the complexity of the world.  They admit that the social world is 
best represented by a causal processual model, yet still practice economics along 
mathematical-deductivist lines.  This notion of the social world as causal-processual is 
clearly anathema to the Utilitarian leanings of Bentham and Jevons.   
 
Lawson’s Methodological Alternative 
In Economics and Reality [1997] Tony Lawson examines in some detail the degree to which 
the mathematical deductive method is suitable for economics and puts forward his vision 
for how a suitable methodology would function when applied to economics.  The 
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overarching name that he has for this methodology is “transcendental realism” and the 
name for the logical form that it represents, as opposed to induction or deduction, is 
retroduction.  The importance of this book is twofold.  In addition to offering a multi-
pronged critique of Neoclassical economics and its various modern incarnations, Lawson 
also advances what he finds to be a far more suitable ontology on which to base economics.   
For Lawson (1997, 20), it is essential to form an alternate ontology to what he calls 
Humean empirical realism.  According to Lawson (1997, 19-21) Humean empirical realism 
is the underlying ontology of most of the current sciences, including orthodox economics. 
This realism consists of covering laws which take the form of “whenever event x, then 
event y”.  This is known as Humean owing to Hume’s inquiries into the difficulties of 
assigning causation.  One may hit a billiard ball with another billiard ball in the same way, 
producing the same shot, but one does not actually perceive the “cause” of the ball going 
one way or the next.  One can only infers a cause from a series of correlations.  In this way, 
science embraces a certain epistemological caution regarding causation by adopting the 
previously mentioned logical form.  Lawson (1997, 28) however believes that a better 
formulation for these covering laws would be; whenever event x then event y as long as 
condition e is held.   
   The ontology that is meant to replace Humean empirical realism is dubbed 
Transcendental realism and is also capable of studying and predicting event regularities, 
only it does so in a different fashion.  Transcendental realism treats science as a fallible 
social process that is retroductive, with a main concern of recognizing structures, powers, 
mechanisms and their tendencies that have produced, or contributed in a significant way  
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to the production of some identified phenomenon of interest that are operative in both 
open and closed systems. 
The essence of this ontology is that complex things have power in virtue of their 
underlying “structures”.  Lawson (1997, 21) divides the world into three levels: the 
empirical (experience and impression), the actual (events and state of affairs in addition to 
the empirical), and the real (structures, powers, mechanisms, and tendencies in addition to 
the former two categories).  This is an interesting move as Lawson seems to be trying to 
make predictions by reifying underlying structure, which carries with it the kind of 
assumptive risks that any good Humean would be quick to recognize.   How does one go 
about predicting structures other than by inferring them from other systems?   
The essential method of inference used in Transcendental realism is neither 
induction nor deduction, but should rather be called retroduction or abduction: “as if” 
reasoning.  In other words, if deduction is characterized by moving from the general to the 
specific (ravens are black, therefore the next one we see will be black) and induction is 
characterized by moving from the specific to the general (we’ve seen 99 black ravens, 
therefore the chances are increasing that ravens are black) then abduction is a move 
characterized by going from the observation that there are many black ravens to theorizing 
about a mechanism that seems to make ravens black.  Science in this sense is defined as an 
undertaking that aims to ferret out underlying structures and mechanisms from the 
observation of surface level phenomena.  Law statements then become statements 
concerned with underlying causal mechanisms and less about event regularities.  For 
Lawson (1997, 24) the significance here is that the current tendency of economics is to look 
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at such event regularities, go no deeper, and claim that some kind of law has actually been 
discovered.   Lawson maintains that deductivism is dependent upon “spontaneous” event 
regularities, and insists upon forming laws and regularities at the very level of the 
phenomena being studied.  According to Lawson (1997, 27), the weaknesses inherent in 
deductivism, when used as a general form of inference, are apparent when investigating 
the nature of the situations in which the event regularities are apparently taking place.  
Lawson (1997, 28) contends that economic science, if it is a science, is more akin to 
studying the movement of a falling leaf than it is akin to studying a much more simple 
phenomena like dropping a pebble into a still pond. 
 
Conclusion 
This inquiry sought to establish that both Thorstein Veblen and Tony Lawson offer 
penetrating critiques of Neoclassical Theory.   An examination of the philosophical 
underpinnings of the work of Jeremy Bentham, William Stanley Jevons, and Alfred Marshall 
prepared the way for an elucidation of the critiques of Thorstein Veblen and Tony Lawson. 
Among the main themes found throughout the work of the former and latter economists 
are: the nature of science in general and economic science in specific, the fecundity of 
mathematics as an explanatory tool; Spencerian vs. Darwinian Evolution; statics vs. 
dynamics; physics vs. biology; and the difference between mathematical deductivist 
methodology and causal-processual methodology. 
 Bentham’s promotion of a felicific calculus to be employed by fully rational human 
beings served as the theoretical foundation stone of William Stanley Jevons’ marginal 
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utility theory.  This decision was made all the more interesting by Jevons’ rejection of John 
Stuart Mill’s more nuanced and morally centered brand of Utilitarianism.  This is 
interesting because it reveals that the hedonistic conception of man was chosen not 
necessarily because it was the most accurate picture of human beings, but more so because 
it was the conception most amenable to the foundation of a mathematically based science. 
 Marshall maintained the notions of marginal utility, static equilibria, and analogies 
from physics, while at the same time proclaiming biology to be the Mecca of economics.  
The promised volume that was to recast economics in the mold of biology was never to 
materialize due to time constraints and the difficulty of replacing analogies derived from 
physics with something altogether different. 
 The criticisms of Veblen and Lawson focus on mostly the same problems, with 
Veblen calling for a biologically inspired economics and Lawson providing a system of 
ontology meant to facilitate such a methodology.  The mathematical deductivist method is 
seen by both Veblen and Lawson (more so) as a core flaw in the Neoclassical program of 
research.  Veblen views the system as tautological while Lawson elaborates that the 
tautologies sprang forth from the level of ontology.  Veblen criticizes hedonistic man as a 
wholly oversimplified fiction.  The invisible of hand of Adam Smith is placed in the same 
category.  In general, Veblen seems to view any element that is truly an a priori 
conceptualization with a pronounced critical gaze and finds most of the preconceptions of 
the orthodoxy of his day as ill fit for inclusion in the discipline of economics. 
 Lawson’s critique begins where Veblen’s left off, in both a philosophical sense and 
an historical sense.  The decades following Veblen’s death found economics becoming 
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pronouncedly more mathematized to the extent that, as Lawson pointed out, the discipline 
had almost entirely forgotten about the philosophical preconceptions that had transformed 
economics from a discipline that had embraced moral philosophy, psychology, sociology, 
and history into a discipline mainly peopled by engineers carrying out equations with little 
heed for anything but equations.  The importance of critiques such as those put forward by 
Veblen and Lawson lie in the fact that the a good deal of the equations and theoretical 
models (static equilibrium, representative firms) that serve as the bone and sinew of 
economics ultimately emanate from long ago questioned conceptions of human nature; 
individual and collective. 
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